Manner Coffee

1.1 Identity and operating model

Multiple independent profiles identify Manner Coffee as founded in Shanghai in 2015 by Han Yulong and Lu Jianxia, beginning with a very small shop in the city (CO001). Its reported positioning pairs specialty coffee with accessible pricing and compact, grab-and-go locations rather than a large café footprint (CO002). This is a useful description of the historical model, not proof that every current location or product follows the same format. Manner has also been described as directly operating its stores, a structure that gives it control over execution but leaves store-level labor, rent, and operating responsibilities with the company (CO009). The cited materials do not establish a current executive roster, board composition, or changes in leadership; the founder names should not be mistaken for a complete current leadership map.[CO001, CO002, CO009]

1.2 Founders, capital and disclosure

The source set names two co-founders, Han Yulong and Lu Jianxia, but does not establish their current operating roles or the composition of Manner's board (CO001). Historical reporting describes a RMB 80 million 2018 Series A involving Capital Today, Temasek and ByteDance, followed by a reported RMB 100 million strategic financing from H Capital and Coatue Management in December 2020 and additional investor activity in 2021 (CO010, CO011, CO012). These are dated financing reports, not a current cap table or evidence of cash available. Indexed.vc separately lists four rounds, four investors and US$23.5 million in total funding, with a most recent US$11.5 million Corporate Round in June 2021; that database figure should not be treated as a reconciled lifetime total because the retrieved source does not explain its coverage or currency methodology (CO013). A Marketing-Interactive report dated 19 November 2025 relayed Bloomberg reporting of possible Hong Kong IPO discussions and a potential valuation of up to US$3 billion; this is not evidence of a filing or completed transaction (CO014).[CO001, CO010, CO011, CO012, CO013, CO014]

1.3 Scale, geography and store execution

A June 2024 Global Times report cited media reports that Manner then had 1,295 company-operated stores nationwide (CO004). More recent-looking retrieved pages describe the network as around or above 2,000 locations, but one gives no clear as-of date and the other attributes its figure to the company website; treat these as reported scale signals rather than an audited current store count (CO008). Daxue Consulting reports that 73.9% of stores were in first-tier cities in 2025, suggesting that geographic breadth remains a question even as the reported network grows (CO007). The store model has also faced frontline execution pressure: Global Times reported three customer-barista conflicts in recent weeks in 2024, alongside a company apology and promised operational changes (CO005, CO006). The specific staffing thresholds reported by Global Times are a further reason to request store-level labor and service data; they are media-reported rules, not a verified company-wide staffing policy (CO007).[CO004, CO005, CO006, CO007, CO008]

1.4 Milestones and open diligence

The dated record available in this pool spans the 2015 founding, early financing and store growth, 2020–2021 capital events, and 2024 operating incidents; the 2025 store-location estimate adds a more recent but still secondary-data point (CO001, CO010, CO011, CO012, CO016, CO004, CO005, CO007). A 2025-published teaching-case preview also reports a trademark dispute involving Josef Manner and Comp AG, but the accessible excerpt does not supply primary legal documents or establish the dispute's current status (CO015). That is a diligence lead rather than a verified present-day legal conclusion. No cited source provides audited revenue, ARR, EBITDA, cash, debt, current valuation, or a current headcount figure. The next review should obtain dated company financials and store-level economics, a current leadership and governance pack, a reconciled store roster, and primary legal records or counsel confirmation.[CO001, CO004, CO005, CO007, CO010, CO011, CO012, CO015, CO016]

2.1 The contestable market is urban prepared coffee, not all coffee spend

The most defensible core boundary is consumer spending on prepared coffee bought from cafés and compact takeaway formats, with Manner's reported positioning concentrated in urban, high-traffic locations. This is narrower than all coffee consumption: home brewing, instant and ready-to-drink products, coffee beans, equipment, and non-coffee beverages are adjacent occasions or upstream markets, not automatically Manner revenue. Published descriptions characterize Manner as a compact, affordable, quality-led chain, while other accounts distinguish specialty experiences from discount-led coffee. Those descriptions help frame the competitive set but do not demonstrate the company's current sales mix or the size of the segment it can serve (CM001, CM002, CM003). The reported Shanghai café count is from March 2021, and Manner's city concentration figures are from 2023; neither should be presented as a 2026 addressable-market count (CM004).[CM001, CM002, CM003, CM004]

2.2 Public sizing indicators do not yet support a defensible TAM or SAM

Available estimates measure different things and vintages. A 2026-updated statistics page gives a $48 billion China coffee-market figure for 2022, but the fetched page does not expose its underlying source links and also reports consumption quantities that cannot be reconciled from the displayed methodology; treat its numbers as unverified, not as a valuation input (CM006). A coffee-industry article reports 2024/25 domestic production in bags and a separate per-capita consumption figure, which are supply and consumption indicators rather than prepared-café retail sales (CM007, CM009). A dated Shanghai café count and company store counts are useful distribution proxies, not spend estimates (CM003, CM005). Starbucks footprint reports show the scale of an incumbent, while separate coverage describes pressure from lower-priced local chains; neither establishes Manner's share or its serviceable geography (CM008, CM010). The schematic below makes the nested sizing questions explicit without assigning unsupported values. TAM, SAM, and SOM remain unquantified until channel, geography, transaction, and company-level data can be reconciled.[CM003, CM005, CM006, CM007, CM008, CM009, CM010]

2.3 Buyer segments differ by occasion, price sensitivity, and operating constraints

For café purchases, the consumer is generally both user and payer; the available sources describe distinct occasions rather than a single institutional buyer. Office and commute users value convenient access and short waits, while quality-seeking consumers may value bean origin, preparation, and specialty cues. Discount-led chains compete for price-sensitive daily purchases, and packaged coffee is an adjacent substitute rather than evidence of demand for Manner's stores (CM002, CM010). The adoption case therefore depends on local footfall, repeat purchase, realized price after promotions, labor availability, and store throughput. Reporting on 2024 service disputes linked wait-time and workload concerns to rapid expansion; the assigned 2026 recruitment page exposes no role-level or wage data. These are constraints to diligence, not proof of current unit economics or of a sector-wide labor shortage (CM011, CM012, CM014). A 2021 industry article's per-capita cup figures differ by city tier, but it does not disclose enough methodology to size either segment or use the figures as current adoption rates (CM015, CM016).[CM002, CM010, CM011, CM012, CM014, CM015, CM016]

2.4 Exhibits

3.1 Competitive landscape and scale

Manner competes across several distinct jobs rather than against one uniform chain. The assigned reporting describes its small-footprint, quick-order format as a boutique alternative, while Luckin and Cotti are associated with app-led convenience and aggressive promotions, and Starbucks and Peet's with a more explicit café or premium experience. These are positioning descriptions, not proof that customers view the brands as interchangeable. Manner's reported scale also remains geographically concentrated: a 2023 analysis citing GeoHey data put about 88% of its stores in five cities and about 56% in Shanghai. That concentration may strengthen local density while limiting evidence of repeatable expansion beyond major urban markets.[CP001, CP002, CP008, CP011, CP012, CP013]

3.2 Price and operating-model trade-offs

Historical sources place Manner's cup prices around RMB 15–20, with a 2022 British business-council article describing prices 30–40% below Western counterparts. These are dated descriptions, not current realized prices or a like-for-like price audit. In contrast, 2023 reporting described Luckin and Cotti promotions around RMB 9.9, while also portraying Starbucks as selling a café experience rather than only takeaway coffee. This leaves Manner exposed to a two-sided choice: preserve a quality-led, small-store proposition or respond to promotion-led rivals without evidence here on realized discounts, gross margin, or store payback. Public comparisons do not disclose Manner's current unit economics.[CP001, CP003, CP004, CP012]

3.3 Capability, distribution, and buyer choice

Available materials distinguish the brands more clearly on format and route to purchase than on product quality or customer outcomes. Manner's compact shops and direct-operated footprint contrast with Luckin's reported digital capabilities and partnership-store network; Starbucks is described as experience-oriented, while Peet's has publicly resisted sacrificing quality for price competition. The sources do not provide a comparable blind product test, current delivery coverage, customer retention, switching costs, or a verified feature-by-feature menu and service audit. Cells marked unknown therefore represent evidence gaps, not evidence that a capability is absent. Substitutes such as office coffee, convenience retail, and at-home coffee are not enumerated in this pool.[CP001, CP006, CP008, CP010, CP011, CP013, CP015]

3.4 Differentiation durability and adverse evidence

Manner's small-store, value-led specialty positioning is recognizable, but the sources do not establish whether the model's quality, cost, or customer-loyalty advantages persist outside its concentrated city base. A 2024 report described staffing arrangements tied to store sales and multiple customer-barista conflicts; Manner apologized and said it would address waiting times and barista support. These reports are adverse execution signals, not a measure of incident prevalence. A 2025 academic case abstract also describes trademark uncertainty involving Josef Manner, without establishing the legal merits or outcome. Current private-company economics, labor controls, geographic expansion results, and independent customer evidence remain material diligence gaps.[CP005, CP006, CP007, CP014, CP016]

3.5 Exhibits

4.1 A transaction-led store model, not a disclosed revenue base

The evidence describes Manner primarily as a direct-operated retail coffee chain: customer purchases at compact stores generate the visible revenue stream, with reported cup prices clustered around RMB 15–20 in 2023 coverage (CI001, CI002). A Day9 directory also lists a 5-yuan bring-your-own-cup discount, but its page does not establish whether the offer remains available (CI005). Jiemian Global reported that Manner expected to open its 1,000th store in October 2023 and characterized the expansion as achieved without franchising (CI001); this is a dated store-count milestone, not a current location count or proof of the present operating mix. A British Chamber of Commerce in China article described small shops near business centers and office towers as a grab-and-go acquisition model (CI013), but does not quantify channel contribution or customer-acquisition cost. The assigned evidence does not establish a consolidated revenue figure, revenue mix, recognized revenue policy, or realized net price after discounts and delivery commissions. Treat the dated price points as reported price context, not a current price list or revenue forecast.[CI001, CI002, CI005, CI013]

4.2 Store economics look promising in press estimates, but do not reconcile

Two 2023 articles offer snapshots rather than a consistent, audited unit-economics series. Jiemian reported average daily store revenue of about RMB 7,500, average customer spend near RMB 20 and an implied output of approximately 400 cups a day (CI003, CI004). KrASIA later described average store sales above 500 cups daily, an approximate RMB 11 per-cup cost, a 23.75% net margin and store net profit that “can reach” RMB 57,000, without a clear denominator or period for that profit figure (CI006–CI009). The differences may reflect timing, store mix or source methodology; the pool does not resolve them. Neither reported net margin nor per-cup cost can be promoted to company-wide gross margin, EBITDA, or cash generation. Historical estimates can frame diligence questions, but they are not underwriting inputs until management supplies definitions, cohort distributions, supporting records and reconciliations.[CI003, CI004, CI006, CI007, CI008, CI009]

4.3 Compact footprints may help, while labor intensity creates execution risk

KrASIA reported that claims had surfaced of RMB 300,000 in initial store investment and break-even in just over three months (CI010). These are unverified historical claims, not a current capex schedule or measured payback cohort; the source does not provide lease obligations, maintenance spend or store-level cash flows. In 2024, Global Times reported a staffing allocation attributed to other media: one worker for stores below RMB 5,000 in daily sales and two at RMB 6,000 or more (CI011). It also reported customer-service incidents and quoted Manner’s commitment to reduce waiting times and improve barista support (CI012). This is adverse operating evidence, not a measured labor-cost ratio or proof that incidents are systemic. If low staffing is part of the margin model, service capacity, wage levels, turnover and peak-period coverage need to be tested alongside rent and store throughput.[CI010, CI011, CI012]

4.4 Capital adequacy and returns remain unresolved

The assigned sources do not establish current cash, debt, burn, working capital, store-level cash conversion, or a financing requirement. Historical funding announcements and valuation references elsewhere would not answer those questions even if current: capital raised is not cash available. A 2025 university study used documentary research and recommended online-channel development and employee-process improvements, but it did not quantify channel economics or verify management accounts (CI014). A 2025 academic case identifies trademark uncertainty as a potential source of operating cost and expansion friction, without quantifying exposure (CI015). A July 2025 Zhihu post offers forward store and listing scenarios but says its data come from public online information; the retrieved text supplies no auditable basis, so these are not company guidance or financing evidence (CI016). The verdict is therefore conditional: the small-store model merits diligence, but revenue quality, margin durability, capital intensity and runway cannot be underwritten without current primary financials and store cohorts.[CI014, CI015, CI016]

5.1 Customer offer and product components

Manner's product is a prepared coffee experience rather than a disclosed standalone software or hardware product. A 2023 KRASIA account describes classic drinks and semi-automatic preparation, while a 2022 CBBC profile discusses Yunnan bean sourcing and barista training (CE001, CE002, CE003, CE006). These are historical media descriptions, not a current menu, supplier register, training audit or controlled quality comparison. A separate brand feature recounts an early roasting operation, but does not establish its present capacity or controls (CE013). An academic case-study abstract refers generally to technological innovation without naming a technical product or measured outcome (CE014). Manner's official notice states that it has never opened a franchise or agency, a company position rather than an independently audited store-ownership list (CE010). Current specifications, system integrations and comparative performance remain unverified.[CE001, CE002, CE003, CE006, CE010, CE013, CE014]

5.2 Store workflow and operating model

The evidence points to an operating system in which coffee sourcing and equipment meet skilled in-store preparation, with the customer receiving a made-to-order drink through a compact retail footprint. A KrASIA article reports small stores, direct sales and semi-automatic machines; its throughput figures are media claims, not audited company data or a comparable benchmark (CE006, CE007, CE015). A China Entrepreneur article republished by FoodTalks describes the early outlet as a two-square- metre window shop and reports direct operation at the time of its account (CE008). It also reports an employee survey about possible franchising, but quotes a person close to Manner saying there were no near-term plans then (CE009). Manner's own website says it has never opened a franchise or agency; that statement does not establish the current legal status of every store arrangement (CE010). The workflow's customer benefit, queue time, quality consistency and store-level economics are not independently quantified.[CE006, CE007, CE008, CE009, CE010, CE015]

5.3 Maturity, trust and technical diligence

Public evidence is uneven: media profiles describe equipment and training, while reporting identifies operational pressure points that can affect service quality. Global Times reported customer-barista conflicts in 2024 after long waits and described Manner's stated plans to reduce waiting time and improve barista care (CE011, CE012). The reported incidents make labor capacity, queue management and escalation procedures diligence priorities; they do not quantify incident rates or prove a persistent failure. A 2024 brand-communication profile asserts automated ordering and scheduling, but gives no system names, implementation evidence or reliability measures (CE005). The 2025 academic case-study materials mention technological innovation without identifying an architecture or technical proof (CE014) and identify a trademark dispute affecting brand identity (CE004). The retained evidence does not establish uptime, support commitments, privacy/security controls, food-safety audit cadence, certification scope or roadmap delivery. These are evidence gaps, not proof that controls or systems are absent.[CE004, CE005, CE011, CE012, CE014]

6.1 Customer segments and purchase proposition

The available sources describe a predominantly urban convenience proposition rather than a measured customer mix. Bamboo Works reported that Manner became popular with young office workers for lower-priced coffee, while World Coffee Portal described small shops in high-footfall office locations and demand for speed, pickup, and delivery. These reports support an office-worker and convenience-seeker use case, but neither provides the share of sales, active users, or revenue attributable to those segments (CU001, CU002). A 2025 FoodTalks article put reported product prices primarily at RMB 15–25; this is a published price range, not evidence of realized average transaction value or price elasticity (CU003). The reported Kimi collaboration shows a digital ordering touchpoint, but no participant count or conversion result (CU009). Accordingly, segment sizes and payer mix remain unquantified. [CU001, CU002, CU003, CU009]

6.2 Store footprint is the clearest adoption proxy

Publicly reported store totals indicate substantial footprint expansion: Bamboo Works reported 194 stores in 2021, World Coffee Portal reported more than 300 mainland stores in November 2022, Global Times reported 1,295 company-operated stores in June 2024, and a November 2025 FoodTalks article cited 2,234 directly operated stores as of November 13, 2025 (CU004–CU007). These are dated, source-attributed counts compiled from different publications and underlying data providers; they should not be treated as a harmonized series of unique customers, transactions, utilization, same-store sales, or revenue. The 2022 report also described a Hong Kong location under renovation and anticipated a market entry (CU008), but that historical report does not verify a completed opening or current Hong Kong operations. Outlet expansion therefore establishes wider physical reach, while the commercial quality and durability of adoption remain unresolved. [CU004, CU005, CU006, CU007, CU008]

6.3 Public customer-facing proof is mixed and thin

Named public examples establish customer-facing activity, not a reference base. Dao Insights described a Manner–Kimi campaign that paired a co-branded drink with pickup lines delivered through Manner’s mini program; it characterized online reactions as positive but supplied no sample size or conversion measure (CU009). World Coffee Portal’s account of the proposed Hong Kong shop is historical expansion evidence, not a customer outcome (CU008). Counterevidence is material: Global Times described three customer–barista conflicts following long waits and reported Manner’s apology and promised operating changes in June 2024 (CU010, CU011). Trip.com user posts include praise for coffee and ambience alongside wait warnings; one North Bund post recommends securing seating before ordering, while an undated TripAdvisor review tied to Jinhongqiao says the location is not ideal for quick visits during busy hours (CU012, CU015). These self-selected accounts cannot establish complaint prevalence. No assigned source supplies a representative satisfaction survey or independently verified named-customer reference with measured business outcomes. The examples below are a selected public sample, not a census. [CU008, CU009, CU010, CU011, CU012]

6.4 Retention, expansion, and concentration remain diligence gaps

The allocated sources do not establish repeat-purchase rates, customer cohorts, churn, store-level frequency, lifetime value, or customer concentration (CU013). The Atlantis Press conference abstract frames its paper around promotion and consumer engagement but does not report a quantified engagement or retention outcome in the fetched abstract (CU014). This evidence gap prevents a distinction between sustained customer loyalty and footprint-led reach, and leaves the durability of demand and dependence on any particular geography or channel uncertain. Customer concentration is also not directly measurable for a consumer retail chain from the store totals and isolated customer-facing examples available here. Diligence should request dated same-store sales and transaction cohorts, repeat-purchase and loyalty data by city and channel, customer complaint and service-level trends, and store-level contribution data with clear denominators. Until those records are available, expansion is observable but retention and customer economics should remain open questions. [CU013, CU014]

7.1 Risk priorities and evidence limits

The most decision-relevant documented risks are the unresolved brand-rights issue reported in 2021 and the 2024 reports of employee-customer incidents, long waits, and staffing pressure. Neither establishes the present status of the trademark matter or the frequency of current operating problems. Later reports describe only preliminary Hong Kong listing discussions, not completed financing or cash availability. Historical reporting also placed much of Manner's footprint in a small set of major cities; that is a concentration signal, not a current store map. The qualitative matrix therefore separates potential impact from unknown likelihood and unverified mitigation. No public evidence in this allocation establishes a Manner food-safety violation, current license deficiency, or post-incident control failure.[CR001, CR002, CR003, CR004, CR010]

7.2 Legal and regulatory exposure

The China Project reported that an Austrian confectionery company named Manner had registered a logo in a category including coffee, while Manner Coffee had encountered repeated trademark-registration rejections; the article quoted an unnamed lawyer describing the ground as questionable. This is a dated report, not confirmation of a live case or a current prohibition, but it warrants current counsel-led status verification before treating brand rights as secure. Separately, CIRS summarized SAMR food-business licensing review requirements for chain-enterprise headquarters and stores, and the State Council Information Office reported a 2025 government guideline strengthening food-safety supervision across the supply chain. These sources describe the operating environment, not Manner's compliance status. A license-by-license map, inspection history, audit cadence, and corrective-action records are absent from the allocated evidence.[CR001, CR002, CR003, CR008, CR009]

7.3 Frontline staffing, service, and quality

Global Times and Radii reported separate June 2024 accounts of customer-barista altercations, long waits, and criticism of staffing arrangements. Global Times also reported Manner's stated response: reduce waiting time, optimize store operations, and pay more attention to baristas. Those reports support a historical labor-and-service risk, but the evidence does not quantify recurrence, employee turnover, injuries, food-safety outcomes, or the effectiveness of the promised changes. Rapid service growth can make staffing, training, and quality controls mutually reinforcing: inadequate coverage may increase waits and pressure, while throughput demands can weaken execution. The company-specific leading indicators needed to test that mechanism—staffing by shift, wait-time distributions, complaints, attrition, training completion, and audit exceptions—are not supplied here.[CR005, CR006, CR007, CR008]

7.4 Market, financial, and dependency risks

Industry coverage describes aggressive delivery-platform subsidies and price-led competition, while a China-market advisory article discusses margin pressure among competitors; neither provides Manner's own realized prices, margins, or promotion exposure. The risk is conditional: if Manner responds to discounts without preserving store-level contribution economics, the price-value proposition could erode returns, but the public evidence cannot quantify that sensitivity. KrASIA's 2023 account cited third-party store-location estimates showing concentration in leading cities; these are historical estimates and should not be treated as the current footprint. MARKETECH APAC, citing Bloomberg, described preliminary Hong Kong IPO talks with changeable terms and timing. A possible listing is not funding raised or cash available. Supplier, landlord, delivery-platform, and capital-provider concentrations remain unmeasured, so investment underwriting should require current store cohorts, partner exposure, financing status, and downside triggers.[CR004, CR010, CR011, CR012]

8.1 Historical marks do not establish a current entry price

The investment call is research-more, with low confidence in any point estimate and high risk from financial and transaction opacity. ARC Group reported a USD 2.5 billion valuation in June 2021 and an IPO plan for 2022; BambooWorks later described a market value estimated above USD 2 billion. November 2025 coverage was still conditional: World Coffee Portal said Manner could fetch USD 3 billion in a Hong Kong listing, while GuruFocus News reported a possible USD 3–4.5 billion range. These are dated or forward-looking media reports, not priced transactions or issuer-confirmed current equity values. The sources also do not provide current fully diluted ownership, preference terms, debt, cash, or audited earnings with which to translate a headline valuation into common-equity value. Do not set a target return or treat the reported IPO values as an entry anchor.[CV001, CV002, CV004, CV005, CV006, CV016]

8.2 Store economics are promising reports, not underwriting-grade evidence

The affirmative case is a scaled, direct-operated coffee chain with reported store income that could support compact-format economics. KrASIA attributes average daily income of RMB 7,000–8,000 per store to a Zheshang Securities analysis and describes a monthly net-profit estimate using a 23.75% margin; both are secondary figures, and the profit calculation assumes the high end of the income range. The same 2023 coverage reports 88% of stores in five cities and says lower-tier demand may not reproduce first-tier results. Global Times reported 1,295 company-operated stores in 2024, but store count does not establish profitability. Its report also describes customer- barista conflicts, workload criticism, and a staffing rule attributed to other media. An IGI Global teaching-case abstract flags a trademark issue affecting brand identity and expansion, without providing a current legal-status record. These are material sensitivities to store contribution, rollout returns, and exit value.[CV007, CV008, CV009, CV010, CV011, CV012, CV013, CV014]

8.3 No defensible comparable multiple or scenario range is available

The assigned evidence does not support a numeric bull, base, or bear valuation range, return target, or probability weight. The dated private-company marks use no disclosed common valuation basis, while the 2025 IPO figures are possibilities rather than completed financing terms. KrASIA's store estimates are not audited consolidated earnings, and the fetched Starbucks investor page is a company-issued index of annual reports, quarterly results, and SEC filings—not a normalized Manner-versus-peer valuation benchmark. Competitor comparisons in editorial coverage are useful for identifying pressure on price and format, but they are not independent transaction benchmarks. A public-comparable method would require current Manner revenue, earnings, net debt, share count, and transaction terms alongside peer metrics on a consistent basis. Until those inputs exist, the scenarios below state conditions and decision triggers rather than invented values.[CV001, CV004, CV005, CV006, CV007, CV008, CV015, CV016]

8.4 Primary financial and legal evidence should determine the next decision

Before reconsidering an entry, request audited consolidated accounts and a reconciled store cohort pack showing revenue, store contribution, rent and labor, maintenance capex, mature-store performance, and expansion payback by city and vintage. Obtain the current cap table, fully diluted share count, share-class rights, liquidation preferences, anti-dilution provisions, debt, cash, and any secondary-sale or IPO documents; funding raised is not cash available to common shareholders. Confirm whether a Hong Kong listing process has advanced beyond the conditional 2025 media reports. For the trademark issue, obtain current registry and court records plus counsel's assessment of any naming or expansion constraints. Upgrade the thesis only if independently reviewable unit economics repeat outside the concentrated core and transaction terms leave a supportable return after dilution. Reassess downward if audited cohorts fail to cover operating and reinvestment costs, or if labor, demand, or legal constraints impair expansion.[CV005, CV006, CV009, CV010, CV012, CV013, CV014, CV016]